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Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a ‘work in progress’ report on some initiatives 
emerging from local government practice in New Zealand which should help us consider 
how we think about the role of local government in a world which is undergoing 
dramatic change. The starting point is work which the writer undertook with the support 
of Local Government New Zealand (the national association) and a number of New 
Zealand councils considering the ‘proper role’ of local government. The context is an 
ongoing public debate driven substantially by the New Zealand business community 
from a perspective that this ‘proper role’ should be restricted to the delivery of local 
public goods, narrowly defined. This has included argument that local governments 
themselves should be structured substantially to promote the efficient delivery of services 
generally within the now well understood prescriptions of the ‘new public management’. 
One implication which the business sector in particular drew in looking at the workings 
of local government was that there should be economies of scale through further 
amalgamation of councils (the local government sector having been through a major 
amalgamation process in 1989 which eliminated a large number of special purpose 
authorities and reduced the number of territorial local authorities from more than 200 to 
73). Debate continues, with the latest manifestation being the National Party led 
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government's proposals for the restructuring of local government within the Auckland 
region, New Zealand's major metropolitan area. The initiatives discussed in this paper are 
partly a response, but more significantly a result of selected local authorities reflecting on 
the nature of their role, and the opportunities for being proactive in using their statutory 
privileges in ways that could produce benefits for their communities without any 
associated increase in the cost of local government itself. 
 
Background and legislative changes  
New Zealand local government, as already noted, underwent substantial restructuring in 
1989. This involved amalgamating smaller local authorities and doing away with a 
number of special purpose bodies, and absorbing their functions into general-purpose 
territorial authorities. It was also a matter of attempting to improve both the efficiency of 
operation, and the transparency and accountability of individual councils. This included: 
• Requiring local authorities to adopt accrual accounting, including preparing 
accounts in accordance with generally accepted accounting practice. 
• Moving to a ‘general manager’ model of administration under which the council 
ceased to be the employer of all staff and instead had just one employee, its chief 
executive, who also had a statutory monopoly on advising the council itself (i.e. 
all other staff had to report through him/her).  
 
Further changes took place during the 1990s designed primarily to improve local 
government accountability. These included statutory provisions to require prospective 
accountability – long-term financial and activity plans – and enhanced statutory 
obligations for public consultation. What had been largely missing in the changes in the 
late 1980s and throughout the 1990s was any substantive debate over the proper role and 
function of local government. This came to the fore at the beginning of this century when 
the then Labour-led central government responded to representations from the local 
government sector that local government legislation was badly out of date and urgently 
in need of revision. The Act at the time had been amended some three or four times a 
year over a period of around 30 years, with the result that it had become extremely 
difficult to find any coherent logic throughout its provisions. The Labour led government 
was also aware of developments internationally, especially in England, where the Local 
Government Act 2000 had introduced a power for local authorities to promote economic, 
environmental and social well-being. The New Zealand government saw this as an 
appropriate role for local government, especially as it was becoming more and more 
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concerned with how to address problems of social dysfunction at a local level. It was also 
responsive to representations from local government that the existing legislation was 
extremely confused in terms of the powers conferred. There were some extraordinarily 
broad and unconstrained powers but also some remarkably narrow and restrictive 
provisions – reconciling the two competing approaches was becoming more and more 
difficult. Accordingly, the government decided to rewrite local government legislation 
and passed the Local Government Act 2002 which included some significant changes. 
Amongst those the government regarded as the most important were: 
• Rewriting the statutory purpose of local government as to: 
o Enable democratic local decision-making and action by, and on behalf of, 
communities; and 
o Promote the social, economic, environmental, and cultural well-being of 
communities, in the present and for the future. 
• Granting local authorities the power of general competence expressed as "for the 
purposes of performing its role, a local authority has full capacity to carry on or 
undertake any activity or business, do any act, or enter into any transaction" and 
for those purposes, "full rights, powers, and privileges" (Local Government Act 
2002, ‘Status and powers’, Section 12). 
 
One of the delightful ironies of the changes was that buried in the mess which was the 
previous Act was a power of general competence somewhat broader than the power in 
the new Act. This irony escaped a number of commentators, including much of the 
business community, which reacted with a measure of horror at what it thought was the 
unleashing of local government to undertake whatever activity it thought fit with the 
compulsory backing of ratepayers. The new Act triggered a number of different 
responses. The two most significant were: 
• To heighten concern within the business community that local government had 
untrammelled powers which presented very real threats to the business 
community in particular, but the wider community as well, because of the 
potential to undertake a very wide range of activity with what the business 
community felt was insufficient public control. The immediate consequence was 
an intensification of the business community's representations that local 
government should be restricted to the core business of delivering local public 
goods, narrowly defined. 
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• To encourage many local authorities, often for the first time, to consider how 
their activities promoted community well-being as opposed to the standard 
service delivery activities which for most of them had been their primary focus. 
 
The business argument was very much focused on promoting efficiency as the business 
community saw it. This included further amalgamation on the basis that this would 
produce economies of scale, as well as that local authorities should be constrained in 
terms of the activities they could undertake. 
 
The local government sector response 
Although the then government had made it clear it had no appetite for further local 
government restructuring (amalgamation), the sector itself recognised that this was no 
assurance restructuring was off the agenda – governments change, especially in a polity 
such as New Zealand where elections take place once every three years. Accordingly, it 
decided it was timely to commission research looking at issues such as amalgamation 
and efficiency, in the hope of providing evidence which might support arguments against 
the risk of local government being subjected to further restructuring in the belief that 
‘bigger is better’, or that local government should be tightly restricted in the activities it 
could undertake. This paper's author, in his consulting capacity, was commissioned to 
undertake the work. The resultant report (McKinlay Douglas Limited 2006) was a wide-
ranging literature review of existing research on the role and efficiency of local 
government. The report's policy implications included: 
• Of particular importance for the current debate in New Zealand is what the 
literature has to say about economies of scale as a rationale for local government 
amalgamation. In general, the research argues that larger local authorities tend to 
be less efficient than medium-sized or smaller authorities. More importantly, 
although achieving economies of scale matters, they do not provide a rationale 
for local government amalgamation. 
• Changing understandings of the role and nature of local government, including 
the new statutory duty for New Zealand local authorities to promote community 
well-being, suggest that questions of structure need to be looked at not only in 
terms of efficiency but also in terms of what is consistent with enabling strong 
communities in ways which in turn feed through to improved social and 
economic outcomes. 
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These findings were consistent with changes taking place internationally in 
understanding the potential of local government not just as a service deliverer, but as a 
critical element in the development of sustainable communities. They were not, however, 
determinative of the broader public debate about the proper role of local government. 
The argument that it should be restricted to local public goods was still very much alive 
and well as can be seen from the following extract from a major submission made to the 
recent New Zealand Rating Inquiry1 by the New Zealand Business Roundtable one of the 
country's leading business lobby groups: 
 
The distinct danger of adding to current rating tools is that new funding 
mechanisms are used to source additional revenue without clear understanding 
of the proper role of local government. There are already arguable cases where 
targeted rates (including development contributions) are not based on sound 
economic principles but are seen as additional revenue generating devices. The 
clear issue in respect to available funding mechanisms is that those who benefit 
from the services provided should pay in proportion to the benefits received 
from utilising those services. While there will always be an element of cross-
subsidisation, as for some services it would be well nigh impossible to introduce 
effective user charges, the majority of services (many of which are funded out of 
general rates e.g. waste disposal) could be funded in this way (i.e. in proportion 
to benefits received).  
(Submission 572, Local Government Rates Inquiry) 
 
The same lobby group in a submission to the Royal Commission on the Governance of 
Auckland2 argued that the proper role of local government should be confined to local 
regulation and to: 
 
… facilitating the provision of goods and services that cannot be supplied 
efficiently through voluntary transactions by individuals, firms and not-for-
profit organisations. Such activities involve the provision, funding, or both, of 
public goods and services. In broad terms, public goods cannot be produced by 
the private sector with known technology, except under contract. It is usually 
not possible to charge for them. National defence and street-lighting are 
commonly cited examples of public goods.  
 
Applying that interpretation, two consequences would follow: 
• Local government would not undertake any activity which could potentially be 
undertaken by others, either on a voluntary basis or through contract. 
 
-
1  The report of the inquiry, Funding Local Government (Report of the Local Government Rates 
Inquiry) is available at: 
Hhttp://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/wpg_URL/Agency-Independent-Inquiry-into-Local
Government-Rates-Rates-Inquiry-Reports?OpenDocument 
2  Submission to the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance. See 
Hhttp://www.nzbr.org.nz/submissions.asp?DocType=Submission&offset=10 
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• Local government activities would have a minimal impact on redistribution as 
between better off and less well off residents/ratepayers/areas within the district 
of any given council. The redistributive impact would be confined solely to those 
services where it was technically impossible to put in place an effective means of 
user charging.  
 
Variants of this approach have been characteristic of discussions about the proper role of 
local government in most of the developed world during much of the latter part of the 
20th century. It has been associated with the so-called 'new public management' approach 
which has focused on councils as efficient service deliverers and residents and ratepayers 
as ‘customers’. In the United States it has seen an ongoing debate between the 'public 
choice' school who argue that the structural arrangements for local government should 
provide the opportunity for people to select that mix of taxes and services they prefer, 
and 'new consolidationists' who argue for a broader and more redistributive role for local 
government. At the risk of oversimplifying the argument, the 'public choice' argument is 
that people should only pay for what they get and get what they pay for, whilst the 'new 
consolidationists' argue that local government plays a crucial role in the building of 
inclusive societies, which necessarily involves a measure of redistribution to ensure that 
services are designed to meet need rather than restricted by individual ability to pay (but 
recognising that overall community ability and willingness to pay is an essential 
constraint). The latter approach comes much closer to treating local governments as 
being an expression of local democratic choice rather than simply service providers. 
Readers who want to see a more detailed discussion of these issues are referred to 
Lowery (2000). 
 
The current situation, in most English-speaking developed countries, is one of continuing 
tension between a business perspective that local government should have a relatively 
restricted role focused on service delivery, and the competing view (usually reflected in 
the mandates which central governments provide for the local government sector) that 
local government has a broader role in promoting community well-being. In comparison 
with the narrow perspective, this is still a relatively new understanding but one which 
appears to be gathering ground. Much of this changing approach to thinking about local 
government was captured in the November 2008 report to the government of the 
Canadian province of New Brunswick of the Commissioner on the Future of Local 
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Governance presented by Commissioner Jean-Guy Finn. In scoping the nature of local 
government, his report had this to say: 
 
The shape a local government takes is largely influenced by its two basic roles or 
functions, which are generally recognized and accepted as administration (of 
services) and representation (expression of people’s wishes). The performance 
of a local government organization, consequently, should be measured mainly by 
its effectiveness in carrying out these two functions. Over time, and depending 
on the geographical context, either of these functions may be emphasized or 
receive more attention. It is fair to say that, lately, in New Brunswick as in most 
other areas of Canada, the primary role of local government institutions has been 
equated with the delivery of local services. Rather than stressing local 
government in relation to democracy, the tendency has been to defend it as an 
efficient agent for providing services.  
 
However, it is important to realize that one function cannot be carried out at the 
exclusion of the other. Local institutions exist not only to provide certain 
services but also to represent the wishes of their residents. “Combining these 
roles suggests that local government exists to provide services in accordance 
with the needs and wishes of its local inhabitants” [Tindal, 1977, p. 3]. One of 
the justifications for local government, therefore, is that it serves as an 
instrument of democracy as well as a service delivery agency. (Finn 2008). 
[Emphases in the original].  
 
The experience on the ground, in how local government actually delivers on the renewed 
emphasis on what can variously be described as local democracy or community well-
being, is rather more mixed than changes in legislation and the wording of government 
reports might suggest. First, different countries have different administrative traditions. 
English local government, for example, is subject to a very great deal of top-down 
direction which extends to the way in which it implements the community well-being 
power. New Zealand local government, in contrast, receives very little direction from 
central government in terms of how it delivers on its community well-being role, but is 
subject to very prescriptive requirements about how it undertakes and reports its long-
term planning activities, which in practice have acted to discourage innovation in many 
councils. Secondly, another factor limiting the extent to which local governments have 
changed emphasis is simply institutional inertia. In New Zealand, as an example, many 
councils saw the new role of promoting community well-being as an attempt to move 
them away from what they regarded as their traditional 'roads, rates and rubbish' 
functions to more of a social service role. A number of councils also feared that this was 
part of a government strategy of cost shifting to local government. As a result, and not 
surprisingly, what can be observed in most jurisdictions which have sought to change the 
emphasis of local government activity more towards local democracy/community well-
being is that change is more in the nature of ad hoc local initiatives than any deliberate 
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sector-wide strategy. Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that this ad hoc process 
could be more significant in its long-term implications than any attempt to put in place a 
deliberate strategy of change.  
 
The balance of this paper looks at some international examples and then three potentially 
interrelated initiatives currently under way within individual New Zealand councils, and 
considers their potential to lead to a fundamentally different understanding of the role 
which local government can play in the lives of its citizens, not just in New Zealand but 
in other jurisdictions.  
 
International examples  
Local governments generally have long had the power to encourage innovative activity at 
a community level if they wish to do so. Normally this has been inhibited by concerns 
over capability, both within the local authorities themselves, and at the community level. 
As a consequence, it is only relatively recently that whole sectors have been adopting, or 
been required to adopt, strategies which emphasise developing community capability. 
One obvious strategy is the use of the local authority's procurement powers to purchase 
from a community-based third-party services which it wishes to deliver to its 
constituents. There have been occasional instances of this within most local authority 
jurisdictions with initiatives such as the establishment of trusts, independent of the local 
authority, but operating under contract to deliver cultural and recreational services, but 
these have tended by and large to stay within well-defined boundaries set by the local 
authority itself.  There is evidence that the real gains from this approach come when the 
community- based third-party has the mandate and structure to grow its activities beyond 
the original confines of the local authority's own requirements. An early example from 
England is Greenwich Leisure Ltd, which has developed into a very successful 
employee-owned business contracting to a large number of local authorities.   
 
In 1993 the London Borough of Greenwich was required to make very substantial budget 
cuts. One area in which it looked for savings was its leisure activities. The conventional 
approach would have been to cut back its investment in the management of leisure 
facilities. Instead the council decided to convert the leisure management activity into a 
separate business. The form chosen was an Industrial and Provident Society: a not-for-
profit entity controlled by its employees with council support coming through its 
procurement policy – by purchasing leisure management services from the new entity. It 
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commenced business operating seven leisure centres all on behalf of Greenwich Borough 
Council. It has grown to become one of the largest leisure management businesses in the 
United Kingdom, providing management services to a number of local authorities, 
operating more than 70 centres, employing in excess of 4000 staff and winning a number 
of national awards for service and quality. The council has benefited significantly as the 
success of Greenwich Leisure Ltd has underpinned the establishment of additional 
leisure centres within Greenwich, as well as the provision of a wider range of leisure 
services, and the business itself has become a significant employer. 
 
As is the case with much of local government innovation in England, central government 
has recently determined that the development of what are referred to as social enterprises 
within communities should be encouraged. It is effectively directing local government to 
use its procurement powers as a means of growing the social enterprise sector. The 2008 
White Paper on local government, Communities in control: real people, real power, 
includes the following: 
 
Communities and Local Government [the department responsible for local 
government] wants communities to benefit fully from the skills, knowledge and 
expertise of social enterprises. A new Social Enterprise Unit is in the process 
of being established that will champion the role of social enterprise models in 
delivering Communities and Local Government’s strategic objectives, by 
recognising their contribution in areas such as housing, regeneration and 
creating empowered and cohesive communities. Supporting social enterprises to 
empower communities and local residents is a key theme of the new 
Empowerment Fund, details of which are published alongside this White Paper. 
 
In addition we will encourage local authorities to ensure that social 
enterprises are able to compete fairly for contracts. Social enterprises often 
offer good value for money and innovation. However, they also often experience 
difficulties in breaking into the local government market. Local authorities 
should think about their role in supporting and promoting social enterprises 
through procurement. For example, contracts should be advertised in forums 
social enterprises access and contracts could be broken down into smaller 
sections making it easier for social enterprises to bid for them. (Communities in 
control 2008, 10) [Emphases in the original.] 
 
In Melbourne, Australia, Moreland Energy Foundation Ltd (MEFL) provides another 
interesting example of a social enterprise, especially relevant for councils which are 
interested in promoting energy efficiency. MEFL is an independent not-for-profit 
organization established by the Moreland City Council from the proceeds from 
compulsory privatisation in the 1990s of its municipal electricity undertaking, to help 
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reduce greenhouse gas emissions across the municipality.3 Effectively, the city had made 
the decision that the promotion of energy efficiency was something it should support but 
that it was best done through an independent entity funded by the city, rather than 
through the council itself. MEFL works with households, businesses, schools and 
community groups helping to: 
• reduce wasteful energy use 
• save money on power bills  
• make buildings more comfortable to live and work in all year round.  
 
This work is done through: 
• advice, training, consultancy services and advocacy work  
• cheap and easy energy-saving tips, resource guides and information kits  
• a ‘Five Star Home Renovator's Service’  
• detailed energy audits and recommendations.  
 
MEFL also works on climate change and energy initiatives with other councils in its part 
of the metropolitan area. One of its recent initiatives, working with Darebin City 
Council, is Community Power, a partnership with Origin Energy to supply green power 
(see www.communitypower.org). 
 
The purpose of both these examples is to illustrate that the potential for local government 
procurement activity to support the establishment and growth of quite innovative 
organisations is very real. In a wider sense, both also illustrate the point that creative 
thinking by local authorities can unlock very significant potential within their 
communities which might otherwise go untapped. 
 
New Zealand  
This part of the paper will look at three separate initiatives currently in place or under 
development which have the potential to radically reshape the way we think about the 
role of local government. They are rates postponement, community banking and 
community management of council assets. 
 
 
                                                 
3  Moreland municipality is on the fringe of the inner-city of Melbourne. 
 
McKINLAY: New directions in New Zealand local government
 
 
 
 
 CJLG March 2010 168 
 
Rates postponement 
The legislative changes which made promoting community well-being the purpose of 
New Zealand local government were part of a wider rewrite of local government 
legislation which amongst other things gave local authorities greater discretion in the 
way they undertook their activities, but also required greater accountability, including 
prospective accountability. One major objective of the rewrite was to streamline 
legislation. Crucially as this turned out, it included changing two important elements of 
rating law: 
• The existing power to impose a special rate over part of the district, intended 
primarily to meet the cost of debt servicing for a loan raised to provide 
expenditure benefiting only part of the district, was replaced by the power to 
impose a targeted rate on the whole of the district, part of the district or even a 
single property and for a range of matters including "The provision or 
availability to the land of a service provided by, or on behalf of, the local 
authority." 
• Existing provisions enabling local authorities to postpone the payment of 
residential rates on hardship grounds were replaced with broader provisions 
which in effect now allow local authorities to adopt whatever postponement 
policy or policies they wish so long as they do so through a defined consultative 
process (the council's Long-Term Council Community Plan). 
 
The introduction of these legislative changes coincided with the beginnings of the major 
residential property boom which much of the world experienced in the lead up to the 
global financial crisis. In New Zealand, this had a particular impact on certain categories 
of ratepayer – those who owned residential property in prime locations such as coastal or 
other waterfront, and high-quality rural lifestyle areas. New Zealand local authorities 
revalue properties for rating purposes at least once every three years and quite often 
annually. Councils with significant areas of premium properties within their districts 
found that the rateable values of different types of residential properties were changing 
by vastly different proportions. As an extreme example, one council in one revaluation 
recorded changes ranging from -10% to +300%. A complicating factor was that many of 
these premium properties were owned by retired people on low fixed incomes - quite 
commonly living in the beach house which they had bought some 30 or 40 years ago and 
whose value had now risen dramatically because of increasing land prices. This 
presented councils with a very real challenge. There was no real case for remitting rates, 
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or trying to set rates on an age-related basis (which was not possible under the legislation 
anyway), but it was very clear that a number of older people were going to be facing 
genuine difficulty – in the jargon, they were 'asset rich but income poor'.  For some of 
these authorities, addressing this was not just a matter of political pressure from 
disgruntled ratepayers, but also an obvious community well-being issue. They combined 
to develop best practice methodologies for offering older people the opportunity of 
postponing their rates indefinitely on a basis designed to be cost neutral between 
ratepayers who took advantage of rates postponement, and ratepayers generally. 
 
So far, this sat reasonably well within conventional local government activity. The rates 
postponement arrangements were far more user-friendly than the previous hardship 
provisions, but entirely consistent with the way that local authorities had managed rating 
over many years (including the fact that they enjoy the benefit of a statutory first charge 
over the land to secure the unpaid rates).  The next step was logical, apparently 
incremental, but in practice a fundamental shift in the role of local government. The chief 
executive, who at the time chaired the joint committee which oversaw the operation of 
the rates postponement group, began reflecting on the relationship between rates 
postponement and community well-being. He was very aware of the fact that a number 
of the older people within his district lived in homes which were not well insulated and 
were also poorly heated. The result was quite serious health problems particularly during 
winter, especially as many older people believed they could not afford the costs of 
properly heating their homes.  He raised the question of whether rates postponement 
could be used as a mechanism for enabling older people to better manage the energy 
related aspects of their quality of life. At the same time the government's Energy 
Efficiency and Conservation Authority (EECA) was looking to extend the uptake of 
residential retrofits, primarily for energy efficiency purposes but also very much in 
recognition of the resultant health benefits. The two came together. EECA had developed 
a new subsidy program to encourage home insulation and heating upgrades. It would 
either give the homeowner a grant if the homeowner was in a position to fund the capital 
cost, or provide an interest-rate subsidy if the homeowner needed to borrow. It 
recognised that for older people on low fixed incomes, even an interest-rate subsidy 
might not be sufficient as they were likely to have difficulty managing the capital 
repayments. Accordingly it wanted an option which would allow older people to draw 
down the equity in their homes. 
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In New Zealand, as in Australia, the private sector in recent years has developed various 
forms of home equity release. However, as experience with these options has grown, so 
has the resistance of older people to their use. There is a growing sense that they are both 
very costly, and carry with them unacceptable risks. EECA was told quite firmly by older 
persons’ advocates that a private sector option would not be acceptable. Instead, EECA 
has worked with local government to develop a rates-based solution. This involves the 
local authority adopting a policy of encouraging home retrofits, levying a targeted rate to 
cover the home owner's contribution to the cost of individual retrofits, and then 
postponing that rate. It is seen by older people themselves as an extremely cost-effective 
and fair way of facilitating home equity release.  It is clear, in looking at the way this 
would work, that local authorities have a very considerable comparative advantage for 
reasons including: 
• In jurisdictions where local authorities levy some form of rate or property tax 
they will have a comprehensive record of every residential property and its 
ownership. This in itself is a unique resource which would be extraordinarily 
expensive to replicate. 
• An already established system for levying individual properties and where 
appropriate postponing any levy. 
• A very simple means of establishing priority to protect any outstanding debt 
balance. 
• The ability to exactly match the amount of the targeted rate to the cost of the 
specific service. 
• An acceptance that their involvement in this type of activity is a ratepayer 
service, not a for-profit venture. In New Zealand at least, the statutory framework 
prevents councils from making a surplus from rates postponement (the 
legislation permits cost recovery but no more). 
 
The legislative framework which is enabling home equity release is general in its terms, 
and not specific to energy retrofits. As noted above, a New Zealand local authority can 
impose a targeted rate for "The provision or availability to the land of a service provided 
by, or on behalf of, the local authority."  Informal discussions are currently under way on 
how this approach could be extended to other services which might improve the quality 
of life of older people. Possible examples include home maintenance generally, personal 
services which would support ageing in place, and possibly discretionary health care 
(recognising that the likely health needs of our ageing populations are likely to far 
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outstrip the funding capability of governments).  The most interesting possibility is the 
idea of a debit card which an older person could use to pay for a range of services from 
approved providers (important to ensure that older persons are getting both good service 
and value for money). The older person could either pay some or all of the outstanding 
balance as it falls due, or have payment default to a targeted rate which was then 
postponed.  One issue for local authorities, if this use of the rating system becomes more 
common, is who ensures the quality and value for money aspects of any service. Under 
the arrangement with EECA, it takes responsibility for approving installers, and 
monitoring their performance so that the local authority has no need to be concerned 
about these aspects.  Expansion to a wider range of services would almost certainly 
require the establishment of some arm's-length arrangement to be responsible for 
specifying service requirements, approving providers, and monitoring service quality and 
value for money. 
 
Another issue is what this means for local authority balance sheets. Postponed rates are a 
very secure financial asset. The risk of loss in any individual case is minimal. However, 
they are hardly liquid and the average rates postponement arrangement is likely to remain 
on the local authority's books for anything up to 10, 15 or more years. It is recognised 
that, as the use of rates postponement grows, this question will need to be addressed. It is 
seen, however, as more in the nature of a technical issue than a real threat to local 
authority balance-sheet capability. The likeliest medium-term solution is an option or 
options which will see local government's comparative advantage (database, collection 
capability, community base etc) used as the means of delivering home equity release to 
support a wide range of services, but with the funding arrangements being held 
elsewhere. The key policy issue here is whether this is the type of activity which local 
governments should be engaged with. What will increasingly become the short answer 
when this issue is discussed is: why would you want to leave this option out of the range 
of mechanisms which will be needed to ensure that older people can afford a reasonable 
quality of life, without bankrupting the taxpayer? 
 
Community banking 
There is an increasing awareness that one significant issue in dealing with social 
exclusion is access to financial services. This has been recognised, for example, in the 
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work of the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research.4 This also 
has been a concern for some local authorities within New Zealand. It has resulted in them 
exploring the possibility of a New Zealand equivalent of the Bendigo Bank's community 
banking initiative in Australia.5 In contrast, however, to the Bendigo approach, the New 
Zealand initiative will involve local government as a facilitator working in partnership 
with a registered bank. In a number of cases this will extend to providing premises on a 
co-location approach with local authority service centres (expected to provide cost 
benefits both for the banking entity and for the local authority itself). The purpose is not 
to have local government get into the banking business, so much as to facilitate a new 
and potentially valuable community resource. After looking closely at the Bendigo 
model, the New Zealand local authorities involved with this initiative have concluded 
that community banking offers benefits including: 
• A stronger focus on the needs of the local community, including improved access 
to banking services. 
• Over time, a new source of funding for community activity. 
• An important new community capability. As an example, there is a very real 
possibility that community bank branches, once established, could play a role in 
ensuring quality of service and value for money for rates postponement funded 
services - and the banking partner could be the provider of the debit card 
arrangement and otherwise play an important funding role. 
 
There has been some critical comment suggesting that local authorities have no business 
getting into banking. The local government response has been first that they are not 
getting into banking – branches will be community owned, not local government owned. 
Individual local authorities will be involved as facilitators, with some sharing of facilities 
and potentially staff with the principal objective of reducing costs for both parties.  
 
l
4  See Rosanna Scutella, Roger Wilkins and Michael Horn, ‘Measuring Poverty and Social Exclusion in 
Australia: A Proposed Multidimensional Framework for Identifying Socio-Economic Disadvantage,’ 
Working paper 4/09, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, available at: 
Hhttp://ideas.repec.org/p/iae/iaewps/wp2009n04.htm  
5  Community banking operates as a franchise. Bendigo Bank is the franchisor, provides all of the 
banking products and services, and is responsible for quality assurance and oversight of individual 
outlets. Outlets themselves are owned by stand-alone companies with shareholding spread quite 
widely through their individual communities. Franchise profits are split between shareholders, 
reserves to build up capital, and community distributions. In some instances, individual 
community bank branches are now capable of distributing in excess of $A100,000 annually. 
Community bank boards also act as a new and important source of community capability, with 
individual bank branches increasingly taking the lead in management of community projects 
which require the type of capability normally only found in commercial organisations. 
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Perhaps more importantly, local government has also emphasised that financial services 
are just as much a part of community infrastructure as water, roading or sewerage, or for 
that matter broadband. It is extremely difficult to understand why local authorities should 
be seen as natural facilitators of broadband development but should not be involved in 
the development of improved access to financial services.  
 
Community management of council assets 
Most councils hold very extensive assets, especially in the form of land, much of which 
may be relatively under-utilised but which is nonetheless retained in council ownership 
quite legitimately because it is seen as being a community resource which should be held 
for the community's benefit. Especially as council funding comes under increasing 
pressure, there is a strong argument that all councils should do what they can to get the 
maximum benefit from the assets they hold. Often this may involve quite significant 
development activity.  Few councils have the commercial skills and experience to 
compete with the private sector in development. Those which are successful in doing so 
are often, in effect, exploiting a relative monopoly position.  The immediate option of ‘if 
you don't have the skills acquire them’ is not really feasible. First, skills are required at 
both the management and governance levels. It is simply not sufficient to appoint 
experienced development staff but have them reporting to elected members who do not 
have the skills, experience and capability required for the governance of substantial 
development activity. Secondly, it is extremely difficult both to appoint adequately 
qualified people, and to ensure that the mix of elected members includes the appropriate 
skills: this is not how democracy always works.  This will be the case even if the 
community has within it people with the requisite skills who are interested in helping the 
community develop its asset base. One reason is that people with high level commercial 
skills will often find it frustrating working within a council environment either as 
management, or in a governance role as elected members. 
 
One New Zealand local authority has recently taken an initiative to deal with this 
problem. It owns substantial land resources which are likely to increase significantly in 
value both because of the council's own prime coastal situation and because of some 
major developments taking place within the district. It very much wants to ensure that the 
community as a whole benefits from the development it is expecting, rather than a few, 
almost certainly out of town, developers. It also has within its business community 
people with very good commercial track records who are prepared to put time and effort 
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into helping the council add value to its assets.  What the council has done is to establish 
an incorporated charitable trust with a brief to create, manage, and distribute community 
wealth. The trustees are selected on a 'fit for purpose' basis. The council and the trust are 
together evaluating the council's portfolio. Land selected for development will be made 
available to the trust under a development licence designed to ensure that, if development 
does not proceed, the land reverts to the council. It is an exciting way of combining 
private sector skills with community objectives, ensuring that resources built up in the 
community over the years are not lost simply because the council itself lacks the skill 
base required. It also fits very well with the emerging emphasis on using council 
procurement policy as a means of developing or enabling community capability. 
 
Conclusion  
Each of these three initiatives is still very much work in progress. Each represents a 
significant development in the role of local government, but also can be seen as sitting 
squarely within the broad principles on which local government is based. Historically 
local government's principal role has been acting on behalf of the collective community 
to deliver services which will lead to improved outcomes for the area. These initiatives 
are entirely consistent with that role. The primary difference is that over the years the 
way we think about the role of local government seems to have shifted from seeing local 
government as a community-based resource for developing and delivering solutions on 
matters that require a collective approach, to seeing it as somehow fixed in a point of 
time in terms of the services it delivers (a view implicit in calls that local government 
should stick to its 'core business'). 
 
The possibility of private alternatives has always existed with virtually all main local 
government services . Toll roads, for example, were common in England in the 18th 
century. Libraries have always had their private sector equivalents. But as communities 
we use local government as an option for a number of reasons including: 
• The efficiency advantages which come from minimising free-rider and 
transaction cost problems in delivering services where a significant majority but 
not all of the public want access. 
• Often, a belief that there are public or merit good issues which would be 
disregarded by private sector providers. 
• The sense that 'community' matters and that there will always be issues which 
need to be resolved at the community level, but will not be adequately handled if 
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left solely to the private sector or for that matter a higher tier of government – the 
challenges of an ageing population offer a current high-profile example. 
 
Thus the New Zealand examples outlined are not a radical departure from the ‘core 
business’ of local government. Rather they are an application of long held principles to 
new needs and opportunities. 
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